



ON THE EXISTENCE SOLUTIONS OF STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL NON-ZERO SUM GAME

Mathematics

Dr. S. Bharathi

Bharathiar University PG Extension Centre, Erode

K.Vimala*

Government Arts College, Kadaladi, Ramnad District. *Corresponding Author

ABSTRACT

We consider a non – zero sum differential game based on the existence of Nash Equilibrium points for a two player non – zero sum stochastic differential game. This is obtained by analyzing a parabolic system strongly coupled by discontinuous terms. The loss of continuity of like feedback leads to consider a parabolic system.

KEYWORDS

Nash Equilibrium, Twoplayers zero – sum stochastic game, parabolic systems.

INTRODUCTION:

The main focus of this paper is to study the existence solutions of a two player non – zero – sum stochastic differential game. We consider a differential point of view the problem is formulated by using two controls and two payoffs. The problem formulation based on the Friedman and Bensoussan and Frehse approach that the feedback is continuous. We are interested by studying the problem assuming that the controls take values in compact sets. In this case we cannot expect a Nash Equilibrium among continuous feedback and the Hamilton functions associated with the game are non – smooth.

Here, we consider a parabolic system strongly coupled by discontinuous terms since the feedback due to the risk constraints. In for from the usual necessary condition is satisfied by the value of the Nash Equilibrium feedback in terms of the Hamilton – Jacobi theory, we reduce our seekers to studying the existence of a regular solution to a system of non – linear parabolic equations which contains the Heaviside graph. By this result, we are able to construct Nash Equilibrium feedback whose optimality is proved by using the verification approach in the series of (2), (3), and (4). The motivation of this study is compact control sets comes from standard non – linear Control Theory

2.1 Basic definitions

Given $T > 0$ a finite time horizon and $t \in [0, T]$. Let $(\Omega_t, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ be the canonical probability space, defined as,
 $\Omega_t = \{\omega \in C[t, T]; \mathbb{R}^k\}; \omega_i = 0 \quad (1)$

The σ – algebra \mathcal{F} in the family of Borel sets completed with respect to Weiner measure \mathbb{P}_i and the underlying filtration $\mathcal{F}_s, t \leq s \leq T$ is generated by the Brownion Paths. The stochastic game will be formulated in this space. Consider a stochastic dynamical system, for which the state process evolves according to the stochastic differential equation,

$$dX_s^{t,x} = f(s, X_s^{t,x}, u_s, z_s)ds + \sigma(s, X_s^{t,x}, u_s, z_s)dw_s \quad t \leq s \leq T(2)$$

With initial conditions $X_t^{t,x} = x \in \mathbb{R}^d$

The payoff is defined as,

$$J(t, x; u, z) = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \int_t^T L(s, X_s^{t,x}, u_s, z_s) ds + g(X_T^{t,x}) \right\} (3)$$

With $L : [0, T] \times \mathbb{R}^d \times U \times Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ being bounded, continuous and Lipschitz continuous with respect to t, x uniformly for $(u, z) \in U \times Z$ and $g : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ being bounded and Lipschitz continuous. The player I controlling u_s is trying to minimize J , while player II is trying to maximize J controlling z_s .

Given $0 \leq t \leq s \leq T$, define an admissible control process $u : [t, s] \times \Omega_t \rightarrow U$ (respectively $z : [t, s] \times \Omega_t \rightarrow Z$) for player I (respectively player II) on $[t, s]$ as an \mathcal{F}_r progressively measurable process taking values in U (respectively Z), for $r \in [t, s]$. The set of admissible controls for player I (respectively player II) is denoted by $U(t, s)$ (respectively $Z(t, s)$). Where

Is a value of the Nash Equilibrium point (\bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) .

2.5 Definition

Pre – Hamilton Functions

We define Pre – Hamilton's

$$H_i(t, x, p, u_1, u_2) : (0, t) \times \mathbb{R}^N \times \mathbb{R}^N \times U_1 \times U_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \quad i = 1, 2 \dots$$

$$H_1(t, x, p, u_1(t, x), u_2(t, x)) \equiv p \cdot f(t, x, u_1(t, x), u_2(t, x)) + m_1(t, x, u_1(t, x), u_2(t, x))(7)$$

$$H_2(t, x, p, u_1(t, x), u_2(t, x)) \equiv p \cdot f(t, x, u_1(t, x), u_2(t, x)) + m_2(t, x, u_1(t, x), u_2(t, x))(8)$$

3. Description of the problem

Let Ω be a bounded smooth domain in \mathbb{R}^N . Let X be a process

$$dX(s) = f[s, X(s), u_1(s, X(s)), u_2(s, X(s))]ds + \sigma[s, X(s)]dw$$

With the initial conditions $X(t) = x, s \in [t, T], x \in \Omega \subset \mathbb{R}^N$

For each $s, X(s)$ represents the state evolution of a system controlled by two players. The i^{th} player acts by means of a feedback control function

$$u_i : (t, T) \times \mathbb{R}^N \rightarrow U_i \subset \mathbb{R}^k, \text{ where } i = 1, 2, \dots$$

If the value functions $V_1, V_2 \in C^{1,2}$ and replacing the time variable $(T - t)$ by t , then we get that V_1, V_2 solutions in $\Omega_T \equiv (0, T) \times \Omega$.

3.1 Solution procedure of parabolic system:

The parabolic system equations coupled by Nash Equilibrium given by

$$\frac{\partial V_1(t, x)}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k}(t, x) \frac{\partial^2 V_1(t, x)}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} = H_1[(t, x, \nabla_x V_1, u_1^*(t, x, \nabla_x V_1), u_2^*(t, x, \nabla_x V_2))] \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{\partial V_2(t, x)}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k}(t, x) \frac{\partial^2 V_2(t, x)}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} = H_2[(t, x, \nabla_x V_1, u_1^*(t, x, \nabla_x V_1), u_2^*(t, x, \nabla_x V_2))] \quad (10)$$

$V_1 = g_1(t, x); V_2 = g_2(t, x)$ on $\partial_p \Omega_T$

Proof: For any fixed p , we use the following results,

$$u_1^*(t, x, p) \in \text{Heav}(p \cdot f_1(x) + m_1(x)) \quad (11)$$

$$u_2^*(t, x, p) \in \text{Heav}(p \cdot f_2(x) + m_2(x)) \quad (12)$$

Where Heav (y) is the Heaviside graph defined as

$$\text{Heav}(y) = 1 \quad \text{if } y > 0 \quad (12.1)$$

$$\text{Heav}(y) = 0 \quad \text{if } y < 0 \quad (12.2)$$

$$\text{Heav}(0) = [0, 1] \quad (12.3)$$

$u(t, s), Z(t, s)$ are control functions.

2.2 Definition

A control function $u_i \in U_i$ will be called admissible if it is adapted to the filtration defined on the probability space.

2.3 Definition

A pair of admissible controls $(\bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) \in U_1 \times U_2$ is called the Nash Equilibrium point of the differential game (2) – with payoff (3)

$$J_1(t, x, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) \geq J_1(t, x, u_1, \bar{u}_2) \quad (4)$$

$$J_2(t, x, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) \geq J_2(t, x, \bar{u}_1, u_2) \quad (5)$$

For all $(t, x) \in (0, T) \times \Omega$ and for all $(u_1, u_2) \in U_1 \times U_2$ admissible controls.

2.4 Definition

$$V_1(t, x) \equiv J_1(t, x, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2); \quad V_2(t, x) \equiv J_2(t, x, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) \quad (6)$$

Solutions (13) – (15) are uniformly parabolic systems strongly coupled by the Heaviside graph containing the First order derivatives of the unknown functions.

3.2 Existence of a solution to the parabolic system

3.2.1 Definition:

The solution (V_1, V_2) is said to be a strong solution, if $V_1(t, x), V_2(t, x) \in H^{1+\alpha}(\bar{\Omega}_T) \cap W_q^{1,2}(\bar{\Omega}_T)$ for some $\alpha \in (0, 1), q > N + 2$

Equations (13) – (14) hold almost everywhere (15) holds.

3.3 Existence of a solution to the parabolic system statement:

From the assumptions the Heaviside graph $\text{Heav}(y) = 1$ if $y > 0$, $\text{Heav}(y) = 0$ if $y < 0$, and $\text{Heav}(0) = [0, 1]$, there exists at least a strong solution (V_1, V_2) of the parabolic system (13) – (15).

Proof: let us consider the approximation problems obtained by replacing the Heaviside graph $\text{Heav}(y)$ with smooth functions H_n :

$$H_n(y) \in C^\infty(R), \quad H_n(y) \in L_\infty$$

$$H_n(y) = 0 \quad \text{if } y \leq 0$$

$$H_n(y) = 1 \quad \text{if } y \geq \frac{1}{n};$$

$$H_n' \geq 0$$

$H_n(y) \rightarrow \text{Heav}(y) \in L_p(\kappa), p > 1, \kappa \subset R$ any compact set of R .

$H_n(y) \rightarrow \text{Heav}(y) \in C^0$ Outside of a neighborhood of $y \rightarrow 0$

Now we denote V_{1n}, V_n be the solutions of the problem.

$$\left\{ \frac{\partial V_{1n}}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 V_{1n}}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} \right\}$$

$$= (\nabla_x V_{1n} \cdot f_1 + m_1) H_n(\nabla_x V_{1n} \cdot f_1 + m_1)$$

$$+ (\nabla_x V_{1n} \cdot f_2 H_n)(\nabla_x V_{2n} \cdot f_2 + m_2) \text{ in } \Omega_r$$

$$\left\{ \frac{\partial V_{2n}}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 V_{2n}}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} \right\}$$

$$= (\nabla_x V_{2n} \cdot f_2 + m_2) H_n(\nabla_x V_{2n} \cdot f_2 + m_2)$$

$$+ (\nabla_x V_{2n} \cdot f_2 H_n)(\nabla_x V_{2n} \cdot f_2 + m_2) \text{ in } \Omega_r$$

$$V_{1n} = g_1, \quad V_{2n} = g_2 \quad \text{in } \Omega_r$$

Hence the proof

4. Existence of a Nash Equilibrium point:

Statement: Let (V_1, V_2) be a strong solution of the parabolic system (13) – (15), then any admissible control (\bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) such that,

$$\bar{u}_1(t, x) \in \text{Heav}(\nabla_x V_1(t, x) \cdot f_1(x) + m_1(x)) \quad (15.1)$$

$$\bar{u}_2(t, x) \in \text{Heav}(\nabla_x V_2(t, x) \cdot f_2(x) + m_2(x)) \quad (15.2)$$

Is a Nash Equilibrium point.

Using the relations (11) - (12) in (9) – (10), then we get,

$$\left\{ \frac{\partial V_1}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 V_1}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} \right\}$$

$$\in (\nabla_x V_1 \cdot f_1(x) + m_1(x)) \text{Heav}(\nabla_x V_1 \cdot f_1(x) + m_1(x)) \quad (13)$$

$$\left\{ \frac{\partial V_2}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 V_2}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} \right\}$$

$$\in (\nabla_x V_2 \cdot f_2(x) + m_2(x)) \text{Heav}(\nabla_x V_2 \cdot f_2(x) + m_2(x)) \quad (14)$$

From (13) – (14), we get,

$$V_1(t, x) = g_1(t, x); \quad V_2(t, x) = g_2(t, x) \text{ on } \partial_p \Omega_T \quad (15)$$

$$\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 V_1}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} = H_1(x, t, \nabla_x v_1, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2)$$

$$= (\nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_1 + m_1) \bar{u}_1 + \nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_2 \bar{u}_2 \quad (18)$$

$$\frac{\partial V_2}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 V_2}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} = H_2(x, t, \nabla_x v_2, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2)$$

$$= (\nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_2 + m_2) \bar{u}_2 + \nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_1 \bar{u}_1 \quad (19)$$

From (15.1) – (15.2), we have

$$\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 V_1}{\partial x_h \partial x_k}$$

$$\in (\nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_1 + m_1) \text{Heav}(\nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_1 + m_1) + \nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_2 \text{Heav}(\nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_2 + m_2) \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{\partial V_2}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 V_2}{\partial x_h \partial x_k}$$

$$\in (\nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_2 + m_2) \text{Heav}(\nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_2 + m_2) + \nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_1 \text{Heav}(\nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_1 + m_1) \quad (21)$$

From the above, we conclude that

$$V_1(t, x) = g_1(t, x); \quad V_2(t, x) = g_2(t, x) \text{ on } \partial_p \Omega_T$$

Let us now fix $(u_1, u_2) \in U_1 \times U_2$ admissible controls and denote

$$\left\{ \begin{aligned} w_1(t, x) &:= J_1(t, x, u_1, \bar{u}_2) \\ w_2(t, x) &:= J_2(t, x, \bar{u}_1, u_2) \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (22)$$

The couple (w_1, w_2) solves the following parabolic system:

$$\frac{\partial w_1}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 w_1}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} = H_1(x, t, \nabla_x w_1, u_1, \bar{u}_2)$$

$$= (\nabla_x w_1 \cdot f_1 + m_1) \bar{u}_1 + \nabla_x w_1 \cdot f_2 \bar{u}_2 \text{ in } \Omega_T \quad (23)$$

$$\frac{\partial w_2}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 w_2}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} = H_2(x, t, \nabla_x w_2, \bar{u}_1, u_2)$$

$$= (\nabla_x w_2 \cdot f_2 + m_2) \bar{u}_2 + \nabla_x w_2 \cdot f_1 \bar{u}_1 \text{ in } \Omega_T \quad (24)$$

$$w_1(t, x) = g_1(t, x); \quad w_2(t, x) = g_2(t, x) \text{ on } \partial_p \Omega_T$$

$$w_1, w_2 \in W_q^{1,2}(\Omega_T).$$

From the expression of H_1, H_2 taking into account, we have that, for any p fixed,

$$(pf_1 + m_1)u_1(t, x) \leq (pf_1 + m_1)\bar{u}_1(t, x) \quad (24.1)$$

$$(pf_2 + m_2)u_2(t, x) \leq (pf_2 + m_2)\bar{u}_2(t, x) \quad (24.2)$$

$$\frac{\partial z_1}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{h,k} \frac{\partial^2 z_1}{\partial x_h \partial x_k}$$

Consider now the functions $z := v - w \quad z := v - w$. from

Proof: Instead of proving $\bar{u}_1(t, x) \in Heav(\nabla_x V_i(t, x), f_i(x) + m_i(x))$ it is enough to show that

$$\left. \begin{aligned} J_1(t, x, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) &\geq J_1(t, x, u_1, \bar{u}_2) \\ J_2(t, x, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) &\geq J_2(t, x, \bar{u}_1, u_2) \end{aligned} \right\} (16)$$

For all $(u_1, u_2) \in U_1 \times U_2$ admissible controls.

Let us denote,
$$\begin{aligned} v_1(t, x) &:= J_1(t, x, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) \\ v_2(t, x) &:= J_2(t, x, \bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2) \end{aligned}$$

Using above relations in (16), we get,

$$\left. \begin{aligned} v_1(t, x) &\geq J_1(t, x, u_1, \bar{u}_2) \\ v_2(t, x) &\geq J_2(t, x, \bar{u}_1, u_2) \end{aligned} \right\} (17)$$

Consider now the functions $z_1 := v_1 - w_1, z_2 := v_2 - w_2$. from systems (18)–(19) and (23)–(24) we have,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial z_1}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{hk} \frac{\partial^2 z_1}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} &= (\nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_1 + m_1) \bar{u}_1 + \nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_2 \bar{u}_2 - (\nabla_x w_1 \cdot f_1 + m_1) u_1 - \nabla_x w_1 \cdot f_2 \bar{u}_2 \text{ in } \Omega_T \\ \frac{\partial z_2}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{hk} \frac{\partial^2 z_2}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} &= (\nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_2 + m_2) \bar{u}_2 + \nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_1 \bar{u}_1 - (\nabla_x w_2 \cdot f_2 + m_2) u_2 - \nabla_x w_2 \cdot f_1 \bar{u}_1 \text{ in } \Omega_T \\ z_1 = z_2 &= 0 \text{ on } \partial_p \Omega_T \end{aligned}$$

Taking into account (24.1) and (24.2), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial z_1}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{hk} \frac{\partial^2 z_1}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} &\geq (\nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_1 + m_1) \bar{u}_1 + \nabla_x v_1 \cdot f_2 \bar{u}_2 - (\nabla_x w_1 \cdot f_1 + m_1) u_1 \\ &\quad - \nabla_x w_1 \cdot f_2 \bar{u}_2 \\ &= \nabla_x z_1 \cdot (f_1 u_1 + f_2 \bar{u}_2) \text{ in } \Omega_T \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial z_2}{\partial t} - \sum_{h,k=1}^N \alpha_{hk} \frac{\partial^2 z_2}{\partial x_h \partial x_k} &\geq (\nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_2 + m_2) \bar{u}_2 + \nabla_x v_2 \cdot f_1 \bar{u}_1 - (\nabla_x w_2 \cdot f_2 + m_2) u_2 \\ &\quad - \nabla_x w_2 \cdot f_1 \bar{u}_1 \\ &= \nabla_x z_2 \cdot (f_2 u_2 + f_1 \bar{u}_1) \text{ in } \Omega_T \end{aligned} \tag{26}$$

$$z_1 = z_2 = 0 \text{ on } \partial_p \Omega_T$$

Equations (25), (26) are no longer coupled and the terms $f_1 u_1 + f_2 \bar{u}_2, f_2 u_2 + f_1 \bar{u}_1$ are known and bounded. Hence we can apply an extension of the maximum principle to parabolic equations whose coefficients are in L^∞ obtaining

$$z_1(t, x) \geq 0, \quad z_2(t, x) \geq 0 \quad \text{in } \Omega_T \tag{27}$$

From (27) we obtain (16). i.e., the result.

CONCLUSION:

The model we presented in this paper is the non – zero sum (in for two player) stochastic differential game with discontinuous feedback. We are the value of Nash Equilibrium feedback in terms of Hamilton-Jacobi theory to reduce the existence of a regular solution to a system of non-linear parabolic equations have been studied. Further, Nash Equilibrium point for non-zero-sum even for $N > 2$ more players game analyzed.

REFERENCES:

1. Aliparontis.C, Broderick: Infinite dimension analysis. A hitchhiker’s guide. 3. ed., springer 2007.
2. Alingren R., Chriss.N: optimal execution of portfolio transactions –journal of Risk 3,(2000)no. 5-30.
3. Anderson.D,Djechie.B: A maximum principle of for SDE ofmean-field type – Applied mechanics and Optimization 64 (2012) 373-384.
4. Bensoussan.A., Frehse.J : Regularity Results for Non-linear Elliptic systems and applications Applied Mathematics science 151-springer-Verlag Berlin(2002)
5. Bensoussan.A, Stochastic control by functional Analysis methods – North – Holland – Amsterdam 1982.
6. Caralliaguet.P, Plaskacz.S: Existence and Uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium feedback for a simple nonzero-sum differential game. Internl.J. Game theory. 32 (2003) pp 33-71.
7. Fleming.W.H, Mete.Soner.H : Controlled Markov process and Viscosity solutions-springer-verlag New York – 1993.
8. Friedman.A:Stochastic Differential Equations and Applications –Academic Press – New York 1976.
9. Libermann.G.M, Second Order Parabolic Differential Games-World Scientific River Edge 1996.
10. Lady Zhenskaya.G.A, Solonnikov.V.A: Linear and Quasi linear Equations of parabolic Type-trans math. Monogr.23-AMS, Providence-RI 1968
11. Olsder.G.J: On Open-and-Closed loopbang-bang control in nonzero-sum differential games. SIAM.J. control Optimization, 40(2001) pp 1087-1106.
12. Sounganidis.P.E: Approximation schemes for Viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations with applicattions to differential games: non-linear Anal.T.M.A. 9(1985)

- 217-257.
13. Swiech.A: Another approach to the existence of value functions of stochastic differential games. R.1204-884-897.